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ABSTRACT
Accountability has become integral to many African development reform initiatives and 
permeated the World Bank’s (WB) policy discourses, with “social accountability” as a major 
plank in its development orthodoxy. Since the 2004 Word Development Report (WDR), 
the WB’s leadership has been declaring its commitment to social accountability. This paper 
excavates what lies behind the ringing declarations of commitment to social accountability in 
the context of Ghana’s Public Financial Management Reform Programme. Empirically, it draws 
on four months’ fieldwork into the accountability practices this programme brought about 
and an extensive analysis of WB discourses on public sector reforms and social accountability. 
Theoretically, the paper draws on Foucault’s governmentality and the notion of agonistic 
democracy central to the recent democratic accountability debate in critical accounting circles. 
The paper argues that the WB’s social accountability crusade hinges on the neoliberal concerns 
of efficiency and fiscal discipline rather than creating a democratic social order, which then 
questions the very notion of social accountability that the WB is propagating, especially its 
discursive and ideological “short-circuiting” of democratic processes. The paper finds that the 
dominant and dominating accountability forms that facilitate the WB’s financial hegemony are 
privileged over potentially emancipatory ones. The findings highlight that as local governments 
become responsible to international development agencies through the “social accountabilities” 
that the WB is promoting, they become less socially and democratically accountable to their 
own populace-the very place where social accountability should truly rest. 
Keywords: Social accountability, public financial management reforms, World Bank, Ghana, 
governmentality, agonistics. 
Social accountability is the key at the World Bank to achieving our goals 
of alleviating extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity. (President 
Jim Yong Kim-WB Global Partnership for Social Accountability, 
Partners Forum, 2015)
We see social accountability as an integral part of, not only our work, 
but of the whole development and governance agenda. (Vice President 
Keith Hansen-WB Global Partnership for Social Accountability, 
Partners Forum, 2015)
1. INTRODUCTION
Accountability is at the heart of both democratic governance and equitable 
development. In most neoliberal public-sector reforms, it is becoming a staple 
objective and “a critical companion to administrative reforms” (Schillemans 2016, 
1403). It has also been suggested that strengthening public accountability is central 
to improving public services (Joshi and Houtzager 2012) and delivering the United 
Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (Engebretsen et al. 2017). Quite recently 
it has become eminent via WB’s “Strategic Framework for Mainstreaming Citizen 
Engagement in its Operations” (World Bank 2012b, 2016). The emphasis is on helping 
sub-national governments create interactive platforms with citizens to encourage the 
latter’s direct participation in political and administrative decision-making. Both the 
Accra Agenda for Action of 2008, and the 2005 Paris Declaration placed emphasis 
on prioritising results, transparency, and capacity for accountability development. 
The Accra Agenda for Action, for example, sought to extend the Paris Declaration’s 
principles of ownership and mutual accountability to include domestic accountability 
to parliaments, civil society, and citizens. 
Following these world events, research interest in accountability has proliferated in 
various academic disciplines (especially in accounting, political science, and public-
sector management), creating interdisciplinary space in which accountability has 
now become a higher order principle to symbolise social progress and democracy. In 
mainstream development policy circles, debates about mechanisms for strengthening 
accountability have focused on “social accountability” as traditional forms of political 
and hierarchical accountability have either failed to ensure effective monitoring 
of public authority (Joshi 2007) or delivered limited success (Malena et al. 2004). 
Thus, the debate has shifted from improving the “supply side” of accountability tools 
such as importing private-sector accounting tools to enhance public accountability, 
systems and institutional checks and balances, audit requirements, and formal law 
enforcement agencies to “demand-side” instruments that enhance citizens’ “voice” in 
demanding accountability. 
Mainstream consensus has seemingly emerged for social accountability, advancing 
ideas about how citizens can exercise control over public authority via direct 
participation in policy formulation and implementation. For WB, this form of 
accountability is central to development practice and reform success (Grandvoinnet 
et al. 2015). The WB’s turn to participatory approaches in its development mission 
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has received commendation within the development-policy community, with Linke 
(2010) arguing that the shift suggests convergence of leftist and neoliberal approaches. 
Some even argue that the contours of a new social contract are emerging as citizens 
seek new relationships with their governments based on transparency, accountability 
and participation (Carlitz 2013; Gonçalves 2014; Nyqvist et al. 2014; Touchton and 
Wampler 2014). Hickey and King (2016) suggest such a shift is desirable as greater 
accountability, whereby governments not only deliver goods and services as per 
policy promises but also respond to citizens’ demands, builds stronger citizenship 
and promotes empowerment. Mainstream proponents and WB also hope this change 
should trigger broad conversations about social and economic priorities that lead to 
democratisation and the realisation of a redistributive logic (World Bank 2016).
Over the past 50 years, WB, with its sister institution IMF, has arguably become the 
centrepiece of global governance (Mundy and Verger 2015). In the global South, these 
two institutions possess an array of tools for persuading governments to adopt reform, 
and they play a pivotal role in public financial management (PFM) reform efforts, 
with much literature highlighting how the two institutions instigate accounting 
reforms (e.g., Adhikari and Jayasinghe 2017; Lassou and Hopper 2016; Hopper et 
al 2017). A recurrent theme in these analyses is WB’s problematic calls for so-called 
New Public Financial Management (NPFM) to be adopted for poverty alleviation and 
development (Guthrie et al. 1999). This heavy involvement of the WB in the affairs of 
developing countries’ affairs would lead to some designating the WB as the single most 
important source of ideas and advice for developing countries policymakers (Gavin 
and Rodrik 1995).  Indeed, empirical support for this conclusion derives from a survey 
of 6,731 government officials and development practitioners from 126 low-income 
and lower-middle-income countries. In their subjective ratings of 157 different aid 
agencies, WB ranked first for “agenda-setting influence” and fifth for “usefulness of 
advice” (Custer et al. 2015, 48). 
Critical accounting analyses of WB and its structural reforms have largely deemed 
such reforms hegemonic impositions. They have focused on how WB capitalises 
on its institutional, epistemic, and economic power to impose managerial practices 
and ideologies on less developed countries (LDCs). For example, Neu et al.’s 
(2002) Bourdieusian analysis explained how WB’s different modes of capital and 
“coordinating agency” imposed such structural reforms. Similarly, Annisette (2004) 
elucidated how WB’s hegemony stemmed from the very capitalistic institutions of 
profit-motive embedded in its ideological, structural, and operational constitution. 
Critical accounting research has explained how accounting reforms became central 
to WB’s neoliberal reformative ideology and why modernizing accounting practices 
became a prerequisite for enhancing market efficiency and improving the efficacy 
of organizational control (see Alawattage and Alsaid 2017). As such, WB envisaged 
massive investments in restructuring LDCs’ accounting systems via such endeavours 
as making harmonisation of accounting standards and accounting education 
conditions of its loans (see Annisette 2004; Saravanamuthu 2004; Uddin and Hopper 
2003). Organizational and managerial efficacy of such investment has been central to 
accounting critiques of WB. Uddin and Hopper’s (2001) “Bangladeshi Soap Opera” 
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showed how the accounting changes that WB’s structural reforms introduced failed 
to bring greater external accountability and transparency, and instead degenerated 
into some private bookkeeping system whereby private owners could treat external 
accounting regulation with impunity. The anticipated modernization of management 
control into a more performance-driven, market-based system thus never happened; 
instead, the resultant coercive control resembled a despotic regime of private capital 
(Uddin and Hopper 2001, 670). Uddin and Hopper (2003) further tested WB’s claims 
of progressive development by comparatively assessing financial and non-financial 
developmental performance. They argued that WB’s narrow criteria (i.e., profitability) 
undermined development by neglecting more socially and politically relevant issues 
such as employment conditions, trade unions and individual rights, social returns, 
financial transparency, and accountability to external constituents. Other accounting 
researchers have extended this critical assessment of WB hegemony by analysing its 
political and social implications (e.g., Babb 2005; Cooke 2004; Neu and Gomez 2006; 
Neu et al. 2006; Neu et al. 2002).
This paper extends this stream of critical accounting research by conducting an 
empirically grounded critical theory-based analysis of WB’s “social accountability” 
agenda. It does so by excavating what lies behind WB’s ringing declarations of 
commitment to social accountability. It draws on notions of agonistic and deliberative 
democracy to formulate the ‘critical intents’ against which any agenda of social 
accountability should be assessed, and on Foucault’s notions of governmentality to 
explain the ‘critical contents’ that WB’s social accountability agenda actually constitutes. 
The paper argues that WB’s social accountability crusade is anchored predominantly 
on the neoliberal concerns of economic efficiency of the ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ 
rather than creating a democratic social order. Empirical support for this comes from 
a four months’ fieldwork into the accountability practices brought about by Ghana’s 
Public Financial Management Reform Programme and an extensive analysis of WB 
discourses on public-sector reforms and social accountability. The findings of the paper 
put the very notion of “social accountability” that WB is propagating into question, 
especially its discursive and ideological apparatuses that work towards “short-routing” 
democratic processes rather than promoting deliberative or agonistic social order. 
Consequently, dominant and dominating forms of accountability that facilitate WB’s 
financial and epistemic hegemony are privileged over potentially emancipatory ones. 
The findings highlight that as local governments become responsible to international 
development agencies through the “social accountabilities” that WB is promoting, 
they become less socially and democratically accountable to their own populace 
where the notion of social accountability should truly rest.
The paper is structured as follows. Section two contains the theoretical review, 
which articulates two analytical elements. First, it addresses the political notions of 
accountability that graced recent dialogic and agonistic debates on accountability by 
focusing on the critical normativity or ‘critical intent’ that social accountability should 
embrace vis-à-vis other forms of accountability. Secondly, it deals with theoretical 
parameters of neoliberal governmentality, which provides the theoretical framework 
for analysing the ‘critical content’ of the social accountability that WB promotes. 
Section three explains our methodology. Section four presents the empirical 
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analysis, articulating how three reformative elements – legal codification of public-
sector accountability, disciplinary intentions and technologies, and socialisation 
of accountability-reformed Ghana’s public-sector accountability regime ensuing 
WB’s neoliberal agenda. Finally, section five discusses the political and theoretical 
implications of the findings and concludes the paper.
2.   ACCOUNTABILITY, GOVERNMENTALITY, AND 
AGONISTICS IN DEVELOPMENT
It is no exaggeration to say that the ‘critical’ accounting agenda in LDCs has largely 
involved theorising the way global development discourses have penetrated their 
cultural-economic and political spaces. Since its mid-1990s beginnings by a set 
of Manchester PhDs (e.g., Annisette 1996; Uddin 1997; Wickramasinghe 1996), 
this project has grown significantly, encapsulating various issues pertaining to, for 
example, accounting implications in structural reforms (e.g., Alawattage and Alsaid 
2017; Uddin and Hopper 2001); accounting and indigenous cultural practices (e.g., 
Davie 2000, 2005; Gallhofer and Chew 2000; Gallhofer et al. 2000); development of 
the accounting profession in postcolonial contexts (e.g., Annisette 2000, 2003; Dyball 
et al. 2007); accountability in the civil society (e.g., Alawattage and Wickramasinghe 
2008, 2009; Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe 2007); post and neo-colonial 
dynamics in public sector accountability (e.g., Lassou and Hopper, 2016; Lassou et 
al., 2019); and corporate social and environmental accountability (e.g., Alawattage 
and Fernando 2017; Belal et al. 2013; Kamla 2015). Recently, however, perhaps 
because of accountability’s increasing political significance in this neoliberal time, 
the accountability dynamics of development has received much more explicit and 
concentrated effort (e.g., Alawattage and Fernando 2017; O’Leary 2017; O’Dwyer and 
Unerman 2008; Roberts 1991; Roberts and Scapens 1985). 
2.1. Accountability in development
Given its obfuscated, “elusive” and “chameleon-like” nature (Sinclair 1995), 
accountability demands clarifications regarding both its meanings and critical 
accounting researchers’ approaches in dealing with it. However, by this, we neither seek 
a generally acceptable definition/approach to accountability nor see its amorphous 
nature as necessarily problematic. For us, this obfuscation is inevitable and, perhaps, 
even necessary, given the empirical and theoretical diversity of the situations in which 
accountability is deployed, and the ways in which accountability defines the contents 
and the intents of such situations. Therefore, here we clarify only this plurality and the 
particular epistemic choices we made in analysing our case peculiarities. 
2.1.1 Functional accountability: 
Perhaps a good starting point is the increasingly popularising dichotomy, and the 
paradox, between functional and social forms of accountability. As discussions within 
NGO accountability have noted, for example, ‘functional accountability’ is used to 
characterise accountability relations, structures and processes that assess whether 
designated resources are spent for designated purposes (Najam 1996; O’Dwyer and 
Unerman 2007). Given this “designation” is a hierarchically imposed condition by 
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the power holders (e.g., donors, investors, regulators, and top managers), functional 
accountability is hierarchical and dictating but, at least in its ideal type, serves particular 
economic-functionalities such as mitigating the ‘agency problem’ (which is of course 
understood to be the fundamental structural condition for much of economic 
inefficiencies) and, thereby, enhancing efficiency, mitigating frauds and corruption, 
and enhancing the techno-economic accuracy with which the information is 
disseminated to the relevant stakeholders. Also, as this designation involves measurable 
and quantifiable performance indicators, functional accountability functions on the 
basis of ‘accounting’, with conventional financial reporting and budgeting being its 
modus operandi whereby accounting concepts such as money measurement and 
entity take precedence over everything else. As accountability’s “core idea” concerns 
the “condition of being able to render a counting of something to someone” (Dubnick 
1998, 76) or “giving and demanding of reasons for conduct” (Roberts and Scapens 
1985, 447), functional accountability narrows such counting and reasoning to money-
measured and entity-bounded explanations and justifications (or even critiques as in, 
say, adverse variances in budgetary control) of economic efficiency and managerial 
effectiveness. In this functional mode, coupled with other supplementary institutional 
apparatuses that ensure its functionality (e.g., laws, regulations and institutionalised 
hierarchies), accountability has become more or less accounting. 
Functional accountability is ‘disciplinary’ (see next section) and control driven. It 
conceives and reproduces the social setting in which people are made accountable as a 
rule-bound mechanism or a control system. In such a social setting, being accountable 
means confining individual and collective actions to rules and procedures that make 
individuals and groups productive and, significantly, their actions visible and traceable 
(see Zyglidopoulos and Fleming 2011). Such confinements produce not only desired 
outcomes but also numbers and narratives (i.e., accounts) that make peoples’ actions 
and their outcomes visible and traceable. Such numbers and narratives then flow 
through the hierarchies and networks (i.e., institutionalised structures established 
to ensure functional accountability) to make seeing without being seen possible, at 
a distance, by numbers (see Hopper and Macintosh 1993; Miller and O’Leary 1987; 
Rose 1991). Yet again, this ‘disciplinarity’ of functional accountability need not 
be understood necessarily as ‘negative’ form of accountability. While, it of course, 
privileges the economic over social and political and renders individual subjectivities 
to economic forms of subjugation and domination, this disciplinarity establishes a 
particular order with which human beings perform within organisations. 
Nevertheless, implicit in this functional accountability is a modernist, industrialist 
and liberalist vision of development. When enacted through pragmatic elements 
of development programming such as WB’s structural and accountability reforms, 
functional accountability brings about development that seeks the creation, 
establishment and enhancement of the “disciplinary dispositifs” (Foucault 1995) 
necessary for capitalistic accumulation through industrial and commercial activities. 
This includes the micro-organisational apparatuses of discipline (e.g., accounting, 
control and performance management systems) and macro-political apparatuses (e.g., 
regulatory and macro-policy coordination mechanisms) that coordinate and direct 
the polity and the civil society towards imperatives of capital accumulation. Such 
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disciplinary dispositifs are discursively and ideologically justified by propagating a 
neoliberalist vision of the populace enjoying their “sovereignty and freedom through 
the free markets” (see Friedman 2002 [1962]; vis-a-vis Harvey, 2005; Chomsky, 1999). 
As our empirical section further illustrates, WB’s Ghanaian accountability reforms 
include moves towards a form of market-based neoliberal development by enhancing 
the disciplinary gaze through accounting technologies, despite WB’s declaration of 
promoting social accountability. 
2.1.2 Social accountability 
Social accountability is often projected as the ‘other’ and juxtaposed with functional 
accountability. However, this juxtaposition takes many forms, generating different 
meanings in different contexts. For example, specifically focusing on the “visibility 
of the self ”, Roberts’ (1991) seminal work on accountability forms contrasts the 
hierarchical or functional form with accountability’s “socialising form” For him, 
hierarchical forms produce and reproduce “an individualized sense of self; a sense 
of the self as essentially solitary and singular, nervously preoccupied with how one 
is seen” (Roberts 1991, 355). While this individualising effect of the hierarchical 
accountability rests pretty much on “how one is seen” as she or he is positioned in 
the hierarchy, it also translates the individual into an apparatus of self-surveillance. 
In this sense, Roberts (1991, 358) argues that “accountability also becomes a process 
internal to the ‘self ’ in the surveillance of the ‘me’ by ‘I’”. In hierarchical accountability’s 
reproduction of self, “the individual is … a reality fabricated by the specific technology 
of power that I have called discipline” (Foucault 1995, 194; also cited in Roberts 1991, 
358).
In conceptualising socialising accountability, Roberts connects this individualising 
form to the Habermasian distinction between “work”, which embeds the notion of 
“action oriented to success”, and “interaction”, which embeds the notion of “action 
oriented to achieving understanding” (Habermas 1971). This distinction is critical in 
understanding the social accountability we are trying to mobilise herein through our 
theoretical critique of WB’s social accountability discourses. Social accountability, in 
its true sense, should create actions oriented towards social “understanding”, which 
nevertheless requires understanding beyond that which functional accountability 
creates. In a sense, all forms of accountability create understandings. However, 
the understanding functional accountability creates is an imposed understanding 
specifically designed to connect the self to the mechanisms of capital accumulation 
and to secure the individual’s conformance to the rules of productive machinery 
and, thereby, to enhance self ’s instrumentality in accumulation. In this sense, as 
noted above, functional accountability is economic and disciplinary but, yet again, 
it enhances the economic efficiency with which people carry out their actions in 
organizations.  
The understanding that social accountability creates is social, promoting what 
Habermas called “rational consensus grounded in non-distorted communication” 
(Habermas 1984; see also Roberts 1991, 361). As such, social accountability should be 
emancipatory, enabling social agents, through dialogue, to reflect on their subjugated 
conditions. For Roberts (1991, 361), social accountability creates possibilities whereby 
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“individuals are rediscovered as having at least a partial penetration and reflexive 
understanding of the ‘real’ conditions of their own and others’ work, and a capacity to 
conceive of and recognize others and their interests outside the purely instrumental 
framework that work dictates”. While Roberts conceives this social accountability 
in the context of the way the individual self is wrapped in accountability relations, 
its own visibility, and its possibilities for emancipatory interactions amid “work”, 
others see it in relation to whole organisations. The latter’s concern is how and why 
organisations should escape being solely accountable to investors and donors in order 
to offer organisations “the scope to embrace broader accountability for their wider 
social impacts encompassing accountability for the impacts their actions have on 
other organisations, individuals and the wider environment” (O’Dwyer and Unerman 
2007, 450; see also Edwards and Hulme, 1995; Najam 1996; Unerman and O’Dwyer 
2006). 
In either case, whether contextualised in relation to the “visibility of the self ” or the 
“social responsibility of the corporations”, social accountability implies a progressive 
social movement, if it avoids capture by neoliberal managerialism (see section 
2.3, section 4, and conclusions). It promises a discursive space for ‘functionally 
subjugated’ social agents to be reflexive of their conditions, and to construct more 
social (vis-à-vis economic) and emancipatory ‘relations’ within and out with “work” 
settings. It promises an alternative to the modernist, industrialist and liberalist vision 
of development that functional accountability propagates1. We further explore 
alternative forms of development next. 
2.2. Democratic development, dialogics, and agonistic 
possibilities 
Exploring accounting’s socialisation possibilities has a rich history in critical 
accounting, especially in accounting for democratic development. This research 
trajectory identifies “dialogic” forms of accounting as a necessary element of the 
progression towards inclusive and participatory forms of development and democracy. 
Significant critiques have been made on the monologic nature of managerialist and 
eco-modernist approaches to sustainable development emphasising the necessities 
of dialogic approaches to accountability (e.g., Cooper and Sherer 1984; Cooper and 
Owen 2007; Gray et al. 1995; Power 1992). Attention has now been drawn towards the 
ways political-cultural pluralism can be taken seriously and how organisations within 
plural societies can embrace accountability (e.g., Brown 2000, 2009; Brown and Dillard 
2013a, 2013b, 2015; O’Dwyer 2005; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2007; Thomson 2014; 
Vinnari and Dillard 2016). Calls have been made to refuse capital market privileges, 
1 However, this does not mean that any form of ‘social accountability’ would be nec-
essarily or always brings out positive or progressive social reforms. As we illustrate 
in our empirical case, their efficacy in effect are indeed contingent upon particular 
cultural political conditions and normativities with which social accountability is 
designed and implemented.  Nevertheless, it should also be emphasised that, in the 
contemporary political struggles and projects of creating a ‘democratic’ political 
order, agonistic form of accountability (i.e. social forms) are much desired and 
demanded than functional forms.  This has even been accepted by the actors such 
as World Bank now, hence their push towards ‘social accountability’
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to recognise heterogeneity, and to enhance pluralistic expressions of public interest 
(Brown 2009; Dillard and Ruchala 2005). 
The dialogic agenda in accounting was inspired by theoretical, empirical, and political 
work in other fields (e.g., Bakhtin 1981; Freire 1972, 1985, 1994; Giroux 1983; 
Habermas 1984; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Morrow and Torres 2002; Mouffe 1993, 
1999, 2000, 2005). Since the mid-1990s, such works have given accounting scholars 
critical insights that facilitated their dialogic critiques on conventional accounting 
(e.g., Boyce 2000; Lehman 1999; Macintosh 2002; Mouck 1995). The mid-2000s 
witnessed attempts at finding a dialogic mode of accounting education. Principles 
that Freire (1972, 1985, 1994) proposed regarding the “pedagogy of the oppressed”, 
and the principles Illich (1971) outlined concerning the “hidden curriculum” were 
employed to construct a dialogic framework for accounting education (see Thomson 
and Bebbington 2004, 2005). Emphasising how “accounting is a process of education 
that can encourage critical reflection”, Freire’s pedagogical “conscientization”2 has been 
used herein to reconceptualise accountability as a reflexive process between different 
stakeholders that can enable them to become not only dialogically aware of social 
reality but also capable of exposing and reflecting on “invisible” and “silenced” factors 
that reproduce oppressive accountability regimes (Bebbington et al. 2007, 363; see also 
Thomson and Bebbington 2004; Thomson and Bebbington 2005). For this, Thomson 
and Bebbington argue, accountability must be framed within numerous contextual 
parameters such as the institutional framework, epistemology, human agency, role 
of experts, language and discourse heterogeneity, community and identity, material 
context, and power dynamics.  
Recently, critical accounting scholars’ attention has shifted to theorise this dialogic 
accountability within the theoretical parameters of “deliberative” and “agonistic” 
democracies, with both seeking to enrich conceptions of democratic development 
beyond its ‘functional other’ – the monologic ‘aggregative model’. While providing 
the political philosophy for functional accountability, the aggregative model draws 
on neo-classical rational-economic thinking to conceptualise democracy as the 
aggregative outcome of rational-economic choices within the market and electoral 
politics. Though providing only very tenuous accounts of democracy, this model 
has been instrumental in establishing functional accountability regimes across the 
world, privileging shareholders’ interests over democratic societies’ pluralistic need 
and, thereby, helping the economy to colonise the polity and society. Deliberative and 
agonistic conceptions of democracy are mobilised against this hegemony to locate 
accountability within a more democratic, pluralistic, and participative social order 
(see Alawattage and Fernando 2017; Brown 2009; Brown and Dillard 2013a, 2015). 
Deliberative modelling of accountability draws mainly on the work of John Rawls 
and Jurgen Habermas (see Lehman 1995, 1996, 1999; Power and Laughlin 1996; 
Unerman and Bennett 2004). It concerns grounding the authority and legitimacy on 
public reason and promoting a normative communicative rationality that satisfies 
both democratic legitimacy and economic rationalities. Deliberative politics involves 
2 This term refers to learning to perceive social, political, and economic contradic-
tions, and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality (Freire 1972, 17).
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the exchange of arguments among reasonable persons following the principle of 
impartiality through ideal speech situations (Brown 2009; Mouffe 1999). Power and 
Laughlin (1996, 444) explain that deliberative rationalisation
encloses the counterfactual basis for the possibility of reconstituting a 
public sphere in which citizens can engage in the discussion of ends. At 
the ideal limit a ‘balanced’ modernization process is posited in which 
the three fundamental spheres of social reproduction can at all times be 
mediated by communicative action, that is, action which explicitly raises 
claims to truth, rightness and sincerity within institutional contexts 
in which such claims may be consensually resolved. This involves 
something like sustaining the lines of substantive public accountability 
between quasi-autonomous sub-systems, such as the economy, and a 
public sphere of dialogue and debate concerning fundamental ends.
In an ontological sense, therefore, as a solution to the structural contradictions 
between the social and the economic, Habermasian deliberative model of democracy 
is optimistic on the possibilities of directing communicative actions  (or the 
epistemological processes of constructing a consensus) towards a universal set of 
doctrines that create an equilibrium between the social and the economic.  This 
ontological and epistemological universalism in the deliberative model is now subject 
to agonistic reformations. 
2.2.1 Placing dialogics in agonistics
Agonistic scholars endeavour to extend this deliberative conception through a 
different ontology of the social conflicts and antagonisms. For such scholars, the 
deliberative rationality based on ideal speech criteria and universalistic consensus does 
“not fully account for the dimensions of disagreement and differences in democratic 
interactions” (Brown and Dillard 2013b, 176). Hence, deliberative rationalisation must 
be “balanced with theorisations that recognise the reality and value of more open-
ended and unfinalisable struggles among actors with different histories, cultures, and/
or ideological orientations” (ibid). 
Although certain elements of agonistics were implicit in previous accounting 
literature (e.g., Macintosh’s (2002) heteroglossic accounting), it was Brown’s (2009) 
attempt at “taking pluralism seriously” that introduced agonistics as a comprehensive 
theoretical framework to accounting literature. Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe’s work 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Mouffe 1993, 1999, 2000, 2005), she proposes principles 
for a critical dialogic approach: recognizing diverse ideological orientations; avoiding 
monetary reductionism; being open about the inherent contestability of calculations; 
enabling access for non-experts; ensuring effective participatory processes; being 
attentive to power relations; recognizing the transformative potential of dialogic 
accounting; and resisting new forms of monologism (Brown 2009, 324). Coupling 
them with Soderbaum’s (1982) positional analysis, she also illustrates how they can be 
applied in a particular accountability tool-the Sustainability Assessment Model. 
Since then several papers have extended and further refined agonistic approaches to 
accounting. Dillard and Roslender (2011) revisited Norman Macintosh’s works on the 
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ethics of profit manipulation, Lavinasian ethics, and heteroglossic accounting but with 
the theoretical lenses of Brown’s and Mouffe’s agonistics. Brown and Dillard (2013b) 
provided an agonistic appreciation, critique, and extension to Richard Laughlin’s 
work that draws on Habermas’s theory of communicative actions. Brown and Dillard 
(2013a) addressed the “death of environmentalism debate” (Cohen 2006; Dunlap 
2006; Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2007; Shellenberger and Nordhaus 2004) to offer 
an agonistic critique on the monologic environmentalism movement and to explain 
how agonistic pluralism can help engagement strategies. Brown and Dillard’s (2015) 
paper further developed “dialogic accounting for stakeholders” by turning towards 
the insights science and technology studies provide regarding opening up and closing 
down participatory governance. Vinnari and Dillard’s (2016) attempt drew on actor-
network theory (ANT) to develop an (ANT)agonistic framework to theorise “the 
moment of decision”-how democratic discussion and debate can maintain pluralistic 
ethos in action. 
Agonistics asserts a “radical negativity” about society being permeated by contingency; 
it also asserts that any order is hegemonic (Mouffe 2013, xi; see also Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985). As such, “a central task of democratic politics [and, hence, agonistic 
accountability] is to provide the institutions which will permit conflicts to take an 
‘agonistic’ form, where the opponents are not enemies but adversaries among whom 
exists a conflictual consensus” (Mouffe 2013, xii; see also Mouffe 2000). Furthermore, 
“the cultural terrain occupies a strategic position because the production of affects 
plays an increasingly important role. Being vital to the process of capitalist valorization, 
this terrain should constitute a crucial site of intervention for counterhegemonic 
practices” (Mouffe 2013, xiv). In this agonistic sense, to be truly social, any form of 
social accountability should construct counterhegemonic cultural practices against 
the hegemony that functional accountability currently promotes.  
Accordingly, accountability should be conceptualised as an ensemble of practices 
and institutions for organizing human coexistence (i.e. ‘politics’) but within a terrain 
of conflictuality informed by ‘the political’3. The focus of agonistics and dialogic 
accountability analysis is, generally, on antagonisms between the polity, society and 
the economy. In this antagonism, the economy is the dominating discourse colonising 
the polity and society with its economic-rational universalism that privileges the 
capital. Emancipation in this sense involves freeing the social and political from 
such economic colonisation. The critical question, then, as analysed in the empirical 
section, is thus this: “How would WB’s social accountability crusade stand against 
these democratic notions of social accountability?”
3 As the basis for agonistics conception of democracy Mouffe (2013, xii; see also 
Mouffe 1993), differentiates between ‘the political’ and ‘politics’. While ‘the politi-
cal’ refers to the ontological dimensions of the antagonisms, ‘politics’ constitutes 
the ensemble of practices and institutions whose aim is to organise human coexist-
ence.  Hence, in comparison to Habermasian notion of deliberative democracy’s 
structuralist and modernist understanding that a universal consensus can be con-
structed through steering mechanisms (e.g., accountability systems and practices), 
agonistic holds on to a post-structuralist and postmodernist conception that poli-
tics of accountability is to construct counter-hegemonic understandings so that 
fundamental political contradictions are manifested and articulated through cri-
tique. It is the agonistic critique which then drives the progressive social change.  
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2.3. The antisocial social: neoliberal governmentality
Dialogics and agonistics provide the theoretical parameters of ‘critical intent/
normativity’ of social accountability-to see this form of accountability as progressive, 
democratic and emancipatory. However, it is rather naïve to assume that all so-called 
social accountability forms encompass possibilities of such critical intents. Critical 
scrutiny of the content that a particular empirical instance of social accountability 
would yield is required, especially when its doctrines are promoted and framed within 
neoliberal agenda of development. We believe that neoliberal governmentality’s 
theoretical parameters offer us the tools to analyse ‘content’ critically and to augment 
the ‘critical intent’ clarified by agonistics and dialogics. 
Foucauldian articulations of governmentality are rather broad (Dean 2009). 
Indeed, governmentality has been applied in so many different contexts and 
scenarios to complicate its meaning and contents. In effect, it is beyond this paper’s 
scope to provide a comprehensive understanding of its every facet. However, to 
clarify the relevant theoretical parameters for the forthcoming empirical analysis, 
governmentality is defined broadly as the historical trajectory in which political 
power is developing outside the state (Rose and Miller 2010). In its liberal phase, 
this included the emergence and growth of disciplinary principles and techniques 
that confined and ‘disciplined’ the human body within particular power-knowledge 
regimes or the “mini-regimes of truth” realised within disciplinary institutions such 
as factories, hospitals, prisons and so on (see Foucault 1995, 2000; Hopper and 
Macintosh 1993). In this sense, governmentality as a particular mode of “conducting 
the conduct” involved transforming sovereign power into disciplinary power and 
state politics into biopolitics. When extended into its neoliberal form, and located in a 
globalised context, governmentality involves transforming national government into 
the disciplinary subject (i.e. governed)-one that follows market rationality and thus 
subjugates itself to governance by market apparatuses. In this neoliberal sense, then, 
governmentality implodes distinctions between the political, social and economic-
converting them all into the economic. Neoliberal governmentality is then a historical 
trajectory of economic colonising everything else-a trajectory the agonistic and 
dialogic project of emancipation intends to critique and reverse. This concurrent 
neoliberal governmentality evolves by offering new technologies, rationalities and 
discursive structures through which specific subject-object positions are invented and 
reinvented (Dean 2009; Foucault 1988; Miller and Rose 2008).
These new offerings collectively construct a perpetual disciplinary gaze. Often 
discursively manifested as accountability, this disciplinary gaze is necessitated and 
legitimised as a mean of addressing certain “pathological traits” of the collective 
social body/subject or the populace (Foucault 2008) such as corruption, lack of 
fiscal discipline, and gross economic inefficiencies. As our empirical section further 
illustrates, the aim concerns enhancing the visibility of the subject’s functionalities, 
and their outcomes, in terms of the economic performance indicators that global 
development discourses such as NPM dictate upon the subject. Operationalising 
“pastoral power” in a global biopolitical space, these offerings are about opening up 
the subject’s (in our case, the Ghanaian state’s) “inner soul” to scrutiny (Foucault 2000) 
of the global state’s institutional apparatuses, including WB and other development 
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funding agencies now appearing as the “pastors” of the nation-state, the agents of 
global emancipation and development. Nevertheless, this disciplinary gaze can be 
antisocial if the subject’s “inner soul” is only seen through, and governed towards, the 
subject’s capacity to perform the economic but not the social, cultural and political. 
Nevertheless, to handle the sensitivities of national politics, neoliberal discourses 
projects this visibility as social and public-offering rhetoric that the agenda is to make 
the state accountable to the public rather than to the market and global funding 
agencies. This disciplinary gaze, as noted, is projected as a form of social accountability. 
Whether this accountability that WB promotes is actually ‘social’ is an empirical 
question we seek to answer in the forthcoming empirical section. We will do so by 
juxtaposing the ‘accountability effect’ that the technologies, rationalities and discursive 
structures WB introduced have produced with the conceptual underpinnings of 
accountability’s dialogic and agonistic parameters. 
3.   METHODOLOGY: RESEARCHING WB’S ACCOUNTABILITY 
DISCOURSE
Africa has long been a site of experimenting and “encountering development” (Escobar, 
1995). During its postcolonial history, it has been subjugated to a continuous flux of 
development discourses and experiments, but it still contains the largest number 
of world’s poorest countries and experiences “… continuing food insecurity, a rise 
of extreme poverty, stunning high child and maternal mortality, and large numbers 
of people living in slums.” (Lassou, 2017: 487). In the recent past, as an element of 
their “development strategy for Africa”, various international development funding 
agencies, especially the WB, has invested quite heavily on public sector accounting 
reforms.  As WB itself claim, Ghana has been quite special in this case; it has been 
often discussed, in the mainstream policy circles and WB discourses, as a success 
story of accounting reforms.  Especially, Ghana’s GIFMIS has been exemplary in this 
regard  (see, IMF 2016)  Hence, our selection of Ghana’s GIFMIS as a case study; it 
should provide a good insight into what lies behind WB’s ringing declaration of social 
accountability. 
The second author’s experiences as a government accountant and his deep access to 
the case site and its key actors have also influenced the selection of Ghana’s GIFMIS as 
our case study. With the help of the personal contacts that he had developed during his 
career in Ghana, we managed to secure a good deal of access points that helped us to 
collect various forms of data pertaining to not only the design and implementation of 
the reform project but also the ways in which the “people on the ground” encountered, 
reacted, accommodated and resisted the reforms.  When it comes to the analysis and 
theorisation of data so collected, we aimed to see the notion of democratic governance 
that GIFMIS has brought about.  
The data collection was driven by the aims of understanding the accountability 
changes WB’s public-sector reforms brought about, with attention specifically on the 
structural, discursive and technical changes as well as how these changes influenced 
the institutional apparatuses of governance and democracy. The primary data was 
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collected through semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 32 respondents (see 
Table 1) from four distinct backgrounds: (a) the Controller and Accountant General’s 
Department (CAGD) – the primary implementing agency of the reforms; (b) the 
umbrella body of the country’s labour movement, Trade Union Congress; (c) civil 
society/policy think tanks; and (d) some public-sector accountants with appreciable 
knowledge of the reforms. 
Table 1: Profile of Interviewees
Level/Organisation Position Number of 
interviews
National Level
CAGD: Deputy Controller General 1
Senior officials 4
Junior officials 4
Regional: Regional Directors 3
Junior officials 4
District: Senior officials 3
Junior officials 2
MDA Senior officials 1
Civil Society/Policy think tank Senior programme officer 1
Programme officer 1
Labour Movement Secretary General (TUC) 1
Dep. Gen. Sec. (PSWU) 1
Dir. of Research (TU) 1
Other senior officials (TUC) 2
Ghana Audit Service Auditor General 1
Public-sector Accountants (PSAs) GHS/GAS 2
Total   32
Fieldwork took place from March to May 2017 with the second author interviewing 
various key actors who have deep knowledge of the reforms and WB’s involvements 
in Ghana’s development trajectory. An additional one-month visit took place between 
October and November 2017 to clarify fresh issues that emerged during the analysis. 
Access to CAGD was granted to the second author in a letter dated 28 February 2017, 
while meetings with other respondents were personally negotiated. Access to CAGD 
also included attending a management meeting at the Headquarters in Accra to observe 
deliberations and decision-making processes and to corroborate field information. 
All respondents were guaranteed anonymity before the interviews. The interviews’ 
primary objective was to explore respondents’ experiences and perspectives on WB’s 
reform activities and its notion of social accountability. Interviews lasted between 
50–70 minutes each. 
The interviews were supplemented by field-based discourse analyses of project 
documentation, materials on Ghana’s PFM Reform Strategy, the World Bank’s Project 
Appraisal Documents, the PFM Act of 2016, and related material published by the 
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Finance Ministry and the CAGD. Also, an extensive review of WB publications helped 
to understand the procedural, technical and ideological aspects of its accountability 
reforms. Each source gave insights into the reform process and how respondents 
experienced and thought of the Bank’s accountability reforms. 
All interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed verbatim while making 
connections to the field notes. Data analysis involved generating sub-categories 
via open coding to identify emergent themes. The data was thus carefully read and 
reread to identify ‘empirical instances’ of theoretical themes pertaining to ‘critical 
contents’ (i.e., technical, structural and discursive apparatuses of governmentality) 
and ‘critical intents’ (i.e., ideological and normative elements of the reforms). This 
process was informed by the theoretical apparatuses of governmentality, with special 
attention to how the reforms reconfigured the accounting and accountability systems. 
Accordingly, as the empirical sections show, salient themes identified were legal 
codifications of accountability; enhancing the disciplinary gaze through disciplinary 
intents and techno-administrative enhancements; and social accountability as short-
circuiting democracy. 
4.   EMPIRICS: GHANAIAN ENCOUNTERS WITH WB’S 
ACCOUNTABILITY DISCOURSES 
While predating structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), the relationship between 
Ghana and the Bretton Woods twins has been redefined and renewed through SAPs. 
The onset of SAPs as a central vehicle of WB lending programmes originated from the 
1970s global downturn and the debt crisis precipitated by U.S interest rates rises from 
1979 (Hanieh 2015). SAPs being implemented through Ghana’s Economic Recovery 
Programme in 1983 marks the country’s formal transition to neoliberalism and the 
virtual outsourcing of economic management and political reforms to “Development 
Partners”4. This neoliberal shift, in Williams’ (2015) interpretation, reflects the triumph 
of western ideology and the West’s ‘Reagan-Thatcher’ export to the developing world. 
Well documented and variously commented on by a legion of scholars, SAPs closely 
resembled programmes throughout the world where the private sector would be, 
as WB’s documents put it, the “engine of strong and sustained growth-a necessary 
requirement of the ‘new global economy’ in which rewards [global capital investment] 
… go to the most hospitable environments” (World Bank 2003, 23). Following this 
perspective, SAPs meant that countries wanting to become receptive to global capital 
had to devalue their currencies against the dollar, lift import and export restrictions, 
balance their budgets, remove price controls, and end state subsidies. 
Supported by physical and intangible (e.g., advice) resources from WB, IMF, and other 
Development Partners, Ghana’s structural adjustment through assorted economic 
instruments such as privatisation, trade liberalisation, and tax restructuring sought 
to reverse the economic deterioration occasioned by years of quasi-central planning. 
Subsidies on fuel, food and social services were also eliminated or drastically reduced, 
while import-substitution schemes were summarily abandoned.
4 In Ghana’s Integrated Financial Management Information System implementation 
project, development partners include the World Bank, DFID of UK, European 
Commission (EU), and Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). 
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The economy responded somewhat favourably to neoliberalism’s ‘shock therapy’, but it 
exacted a huge social cost on the populace, especially the poor and vulnerable groups. 
Thus, the much-vaunted economic victory of Ghana’s SAPs is, at best, pyrrhic. Although 
at the programme’s conception reform designers envisioned specific measures to 
assuage the spanks of adjustment on the poor, Williams (2015) contends that most 
were tragic failures when attempted. Williams’ assessment is substantially consistent 
with work by Stewart and van der Geest (1995, 18), whose conclusion captures this 
succinctly: “The effectiveness of the targeting of PAMSCAD [The Programme of 
Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment], notwithstanding the emphasis on 
this at design stage, has been low.” PAMSCAD was a joint initiative by Government of 
Ghana and its Development Partners in response to the unfolding calamitous social 
costs the adjustment programme unleashed on the vulnerable urban poor and rural 
dwellers. 
This mixed outcome of SAPs- relatively positive economic performances but 
deteriorating socio-political and democratic institutions (including public 
accountability)-is further illustrated in the very few available critical accounting 
studies on Ghana (see, Tsamenyi et al. 2010; Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005; Rahaman and 
Lawrence, 2001; Rahaman, 2009; Rahaman et al., 2007). One way or the other, these 
studies collectively illustrated the paradoxical nature of Ghanaian SAP, explaining how 
its poly-vocal and malleable relationship with accounting technologies perpetually 
rearranged the order of things in public discussions. In this rearrangement, as 
Rahman et al. (2007, 665) explained, “clearly the reliance on the economic capital of 
international organizations has eroded the traditional capacity of Majority-World 
governments to manage their economies through fiscal and monetary policies and 
public ownership” and “the reliance on generalized solutions borrowed from … [WB 
and other global institutions] has undoubtedly resulted in (un)intended consequences 
… and ironies of governance and policy-making”.
Evidently, SAPs have caused more problems than solutions for accountability, forcing 
its issues into the forefront of the development and public-sector reform agenda. 
Policymakers and international development agencies had to take these issues seriously 
beyond their techno-managerial parameters. Rather than accountability simply being 
seen as a techno-managerial imperative of implementing reforms, accountability 
has now been elevated to the biopolitical level: it is now a biopolitical problem, a 
pathological trait that is simultaneously attributable to the macro categories-the state, 
economy, and civil society-and to the individuals confined within organisational 
settings (cf. Foucault 2000, 2003, 2008). Accountability thus became a strategy, rather 
than simply a techno-managerial element, for development. As the forthcoming 
sections further explain, it became the means of realising the neoliberal logics of 
governing the polity and society via the market and rendering the political state and 
civil society responsive to market imperatives. This signification of accountability 
was discursive and political and, in the Ghanaian context, achieved through three 
interrelated means and phases: (a) ‘codification’ of accountability through legislature; 
(b) enhancing the disciplinary gaze (see section 4.2 below) and; (c) ‘socialisation’ of 
accountability through “short-routing” (see section 4.3 below). These illustrate how 
accountability has become central to reconstructing the neoliberal development state 
(or ‘developmentality’) in Ghana. 
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4.1. Legal codification of public-sector accountability and 
beyond
The accountability embedded in WB’s neoliberal discourses manifests a subtle and 
perhaps paradoxical mixture of sovereign and governmentality elements of global 
governance. Specifically, WB propagates a governance ideology in which the former, 
especially the political state’s centrality, are demeaned and often discoursed as 
governing apparatus that must be minimal-the social accountability WB propagates 
being the best example of demeaning the institutional role of the political state and 
its bureaucracy (see section 4.3 below). However, within its plurality of discursive 
dispositifs, WB also emphasises the necessity of reforming and recalibrating the 
political state’s legal-bureaucratic apparatuses to suit its own neoliberal ideologies 
and processes, especially in economic and commercial realms, to help develop legal 
environments favourable to global investment (Piron 2005). As such, WB (World 
Bank 2002, 1) claims:
The last decade has witnessed an increased emphasis on legal and 
judicial reform by the World Bank and its partners in the development 
community. Such emphasis grew out of a realization that, in order 
to achieve sustainable development, the development process must 
be comprehensive, and that legal and judicial reforms are critical 
components of that process. Indeed, legal and judicial reform is one of 
the main pillars of the Comprehensive Development Framework that 
James D. Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank, proposed. This 
comprehensive approach encompasses the Bank’s mission of fighting 
poverty for lasting results. Poverty cannot be fought and gains cannot be 
sustained without effective and equitable legal systems.
This emphasis on the legal framework of governance continues, with the biopolitical 
theme that the 2017 WDR addressed being “governance and law”. It further refines 
WB’s legal framework emphasis but with a neoliberal tweak that signifies the law 
by its capacity to “change the rules of the game to foster more equitable bargaining 
spaces … by changing payoffs to lower the cost of compliance (or increase the cost of 
noncompliance)” (World Bank 2017, 13). So, it argues: 
Law is a powerful instrument for reshaping the policy arena. Although 
laws generally reflect the interests of those actors with greater bargaining 
power, law has also proven to be an important instrument for change. By 
its nature, law is a device that provides a particular language, structure, 
and formality for ordering things, and this characteristic gives it the 
potential to become a force independent of the initial powers and 
intentions behind it. Law, often in combination with other social and 
political strategies, can be used as a commitment and coordination 
device to promote accountability, and also to change the rules of the 
game to foster more equitable bargaining spaces. Effective laws are those 
that are able to shape bargaining spaces that increase contestability by 
underrepresented actors; that provide incentives by changing payoffs to 
lower the cost of compliance (or increase the cost of noncompliance); 
and that shift preferences by enhancing substantive focal points around 
which coordination can occur. (World Bank 2017, 13)
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Ghana’s legal framework for public accountability, aided by WB and other 
“development partners”, derives from the 1992 Constitution, a revised PFM Law (Act 
921) of 2016, the Audit Service Act (Act 584) of 2000, the Internal Audit Agency Act 
(Act 658) of 2003, and other related laws. These govern the management of public 
funds and are supplemented by the Financial Administration Regulation of 2004 
(revised version currently before Parliament, following the promulgation of Act 921 
of 2016). The 1992 constitution sets out the fiscal roles of executive, legislative and 
judicial branches, and it provides the basis for raising resources and expenditure. The 
new PFM Act is arguably a significant improvement over the previous PFM legal 
framework in several respects (IMF 2016). First, it codifies into law the medium-
term orientation to fiscal policymaking, as reflected in the Medium-Term Fiscal and 
Expenditure Framework. Secondly, it establishes principles of fiscal responsibility 
and accountability. Thirdly, it enhances fiscal transparency by expanding reporting 
to parliament. Finally, it enhances the role of external and internal audits and expands 
provision for debt management (IMF 2016). The legislative and regulatory framework 
sets out the basic budget accountability structures, including: 
1. all revenues, loans and grants must be paid into the Consolidated Fund 
(CF); from this, only legally approved expenditures can be made; 
2. appropriate oversight by Parliament;
3. clearly stated roles and responsibilities of the key actors, including the 
Minister of Finance; the Controller and Accountant’s General and Deputies; 
Chief Directors of Ministries, Departments, and Agencies; Principal 
Account Holders (Ministers); and the Auditor-General (AG);
4. individuals must be delegated responsibility and accountability for resources 
through the system; and 
5. all stakeholders should have clear and well-documented roles and 
responsibilities. The Controller and Accountant-General is the Chief 
Accounting Officer of the Government and is responsible for maintaining 
public accounts.
With such recent reforms, as many respondents explained, the legal framework is 
deemed “quite rigorous and up-to-date” and “offers the necessary legal provisions 
to deal with most of the corruptive and illegal practices which have penetrated the 
Ghanaian public services” (Interviewee 1). However, most respondents used diverse 
examples of corruption and accounting fraud to show the realities of implementation 
falling short of this ideal. Many respondents acknowledge accounting irregularities, 
fraud, and corruption as a “Ghanaian fact” and indeed an “African fact”. While 
respondents boldly pointed out that “politics overrun the law” and “the law does not 
apply to the men [sic] in power”, WB has been tactful and diplomatic in acknowledging 
the “contingency” of legal efficacy:
Law can play a role in making the policy arena more contestable. 
Enhancing the contestability of the arena encompasses both ex-ante 
procedures (which relate to the means by which law is made and the 
extent to which it is participatory and transparent) and ex-post ones (the 
extent to which law is applied consistently and fairly). If various actors 
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believe the process is exclusionary or reflects only the interests of certain 
groups, they may not comply, or they may outright oppose it. Public 
hearings, stakeholder consultations, social audits, and participatory 
processes are some examples of instruments that can make the policy 
arena more contestable. (World Bank 2017, 13; see also World Bank 
2002)
Governance is thus envisaged as operationalizable beyond and within the 
political state’s legal-bureaucratic apparatuses, law being augmented by extra-
legal accountability mechanisms, especially those that can transform citizens into 
customers (the overarching principle of the Ghanaian state’s NPM reformation). 
Law, as an element of sovereignty, conceives a law-abiding citizen in the populace 
as the object of governance; NPM and its post-discourses, as elements of neoliberal 
governmentality, conceive a customer/client in the populace as capable of governing 
the government through his/her market sovereignty (see Brown 2006; Dunleavy et al. 
2006). However, for conversion of citizen into the customer to be possible, a market 
first needs creating for what the public-sector hitherto produced (i.e. public welfare), 
as customers cannot exist without a market. The hitherto political relations between 
the Ghanaian populace and the state regarding the public goods of welfare needed to 
be politically and discursively reconceptualised as market relations. 
Therefore, neoliberal market creation in Ghana for public welfare goods was not 
‘natural’ as no price-driven exchange relations ever existed for them, even though 
their delivery was obviously costly. Most welfare provisions (including health and 
education) would not be ‘sold’ to the poor at a market price, and many respondents 
argue it is politically impossible to do so – especially given the party-politics that 
dominate the country. Hence, the neoliberal market for public goods emerged from 
constructing a techno-managerial discourse that concentrated on cost and efficiency 
in delivering state services rather than creating a ‘free market’ driven by competitive 
prices, demand, supply and profits. The market thus created was an ‘accountingized 
market’-one existing only on accounting numbers created through performance 
measurements and evaluations, particularly by streamlining budgeting to minimise 
public expenditure. Without ‘true market relations’ where prices and quantities are 
determined by their interdependency and profits such market variables bring about, 
accounting was a technology for realising an accountingized “internal market” 
(Burawoy 1979) to govern the state. This market was thus merely an “accounting 
logic” or “accountingization” of politics (cf. Broadbent 1998; Broadbent and Laughlin 
1998; Laughlin and Broadbent 1993; Power and Laughlin 1992). Public financial 
management (PFM) reforms (discussed next) was the principal means of achieving 
this. 
This accountingization of politics then manifests biopolitics of neoliberal state, 
which operates through biopolitical themes of ‘disciplining’ by economic or market 
rationalities of governance.  Public-sector reforms, as we will further substantiate 
in the forthcoming sections, is neoliberal to the extent that they are driven towards 
institutionalizing market logic and functional accountability, but often wrapped in the 
rhetoric of social democratic and developmental.  
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4.2. Enhancing the disciplinary gaze
4.2.1. Disciplinary intents of public financial reforms
From a Foucauldian perspective, global discourses of public-sector financial reforms 
in Ghana had the ‘disciplinary intent’ of instigating WB’s and other Development 
Partners’ “fiscal discipline” or “budget discipline”. WB and alike often interchangeably 
used the absence or lack of these to diagnose and discourse the Ghanaian political 
state as problematic (our interviewees concur) and requiring global disciplinary 
intervention. The reformers identified multiple causes for this overarching problem 
-over-optimistic revenue forecasts, excessive capital spending, poor commitment 
controls, weak establishment controls over payroll, and weak oversight of compliance 
(World Bank 2015). Indeed, several Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
(PEFA) reviews on Ghana repeatedly emphasised how pervasive indiscipline in 
budget execution and monitoring processes has undermined successive budget 
reforms, causing low budget credibility. The policy significance of fiscal discipline is 
often reiterated as low fiscal discipline affecting the strategic allocation of resources 
and efficient delivery of services (World Bank 2015). 
This idea of fiscal indiscipline is self-subjugating. The local political actors and 
administrators echo these concerns. As the then Controller and Accountant-General 
reflects:
There are many challenges that continuously affect Budget Preparation 
and Implementation, Accounting and Financial Reporting and 
Cash Management. The basic shortcoming continues to be the lack 
of reconciliation of records between Ministries, Departments and 
Agencies (MDAs) and the Controller and Accountant-General’s 
Department (CAGD) for the Annual Statutory Financial Statements, 
as required by the Public Financial Management (PFM) legal and 
regulatory frameworks, resulting in questions about the reliability and 
credibility of these statements. (as cited in Tufuor 2012, iii)
This view played out demonstrably in Ghana’s PFM reform when the then president, 
John Dramani Mahama, in welcoming a new Managing Director of Barclays Plc 
(Ghana), expressed concern that the government’s fiscal indiscipline had made 
it difficult for local capital to flourish because of the difficult macroeconomic 
environment. He vowed to use the reforms to sort out the problem, the “vicious circle”, 
as he called it. He acknowledged that fiscal indiscipline had affected government 
payments to companies and this adversely affected those companies. The president 
said:
it’s a vicious cycle we need to break and that is why a lot of the reforms 
that Seth [Finance Minister] is carrying out in the Finance Ministry with 
regards to the GIFMIS [Ghana Integrated Management Information 
System] and making sure we budget properly, and MDAs follow budget 
discipline. All these are issues we ‘re trying to introduce. (16 Jan 2014, 
Daily Graphic)
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Accountingized market for public welfare is significant for fiscal discipline. As our 
data shows, accounting performs two interrelated functions here. First, accounting 
technologies such as the GIFMIS should enhance, albeit in a contested manner, public 
spending’s disciplinary visibility and hence its controllability. Secondly, it should create 
a ‘market mentality’ among public officers and politicians so that they are performing 
in a market and being subjected to its ‘competition’, even when neither exists for the 
political goods they are delivering. This competition is more or less felt through the 
comparative performance measurements that NPM introduces. The disciplinary 
visibility/controllability (to the global development funding agencies) and the market 
mentality are key disciplinary apparatuses of the neoliberal state that the WB is 
attempting to construct in the peripheral nations.  
4.2.2. Techno-administrative enhancement of the disciplinary gaze 
Our data deems that WB and others are quite successful in discursively establishing the 
“lacking fiscal discipline” idea and shifting it to a biopolitical problem towards which 
public-sector reforms are to be both directed and indeed justified and legitimated. This 
has made fiscal discipline a self-subjugating proposition in Ghanaian policy-circles 
(as the two quotes above demonstrate). Many respondents believe the public-sector 
in Ghana lacks ‘fiscal discipline’ and thus needs disciplining5. Key to WB’s solution 
is the accounting-based integration of hitherto decoupled and disbursed operational 
entities of the political state, civil society, and the market economy. A current attempt 
at this, GIFMIS, is being propagated to government accountants, government auditors 
and other relevant parties mostly as a “technically superior accounting system capable 
of doing accounting and auditing better”. 
GIFMIS is a commercially available off-the-shelf software – the Oracle eBusiness Suite 
software and the Oracle Payroll/Human Resource Management Information System. 
It constitutes three main system components – GIFMIS financial, programme-based 
budgeting, and Human Resource Management Information System-and has become 
the official system of recordkeeping and audit-trailing for the Ghanaian government’s 
budgeting, financial accounting and reporting, disbursements, internal control, and 
auditing requirements (World Bank 2015, 38). Though with certain technical issues such 
as systems down-times and slowness, delays in manual data input, and irregularities 
and errors caused by poor, insufficient or absent system training, GIFMIS has fairly 
well integrated (at least technically) various system functionalities of the Ghanaian 
government’s public financial management system. It has enabled and enhanced the 
techno-managerial possibilities of “governing at a distance” (Rose and Miller 2010) 
through IT-based networking to ensure the cross-visibility of dispersed administrative 
units and agencies. In effect, although with various irregularities, malfunctioning, 
and possible frauds across certain functionalities and agencies (according to our 
respondents) due to reasons which some broadly categorise as “neopatrimonial” (see 
Hopper 2017; Lassou 2017; Lassou and Hopper 2016; Tsamenyi et al. 2009), GIFMIS 
is attempting to mobilise accounting, administrative, and information technologies to 
integrate hitherto dispersed and decoupled state functionalities. Figure 1 summarises 
the techno-managerial apparatuses of this integration. 
5 However, whether such disciplining should be by WB and other international 
agencies remains a rather contentious political issue among Ghanaians (see sec-
tion 4.3). 
Fi
gu
re
 1
: T
he
 te
ch
no
-m
an
ag
er
ia
l a
pp
ar
at
us
es
 o
f e
nh
an
ci
ng
 d
isc
ip
lin
ar
y 
ga
ze
Di
sc
ip
lin
ar
y 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
 o
f 
un
i
ca
tio
n,
 vi
sib
ili
ty
, 
an
d 
co
nt
ro
l
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
an
d 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
an
d 
pr
oc
es
se
s
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
&
le
ga
l s
ys
te
m
s 
an
d 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
H
ar
m
on
iz
ed
 C
ha
rt
 o
f A
cc
ou
nt
s:
 
A
 n
ew
 h
ar
m
on
iz
ed
 n
at
io
na
l c
ha
rt
 o
f a
cc
ou
nt
s 
co
m
pl
ia
nt
 w
ith
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l s
ta
nd
ar
ds
, f
or
 a
ll 
n
an
ci
al
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 
at
 a
ll 
le
ve
ls
 o
f G
ov
er
nm
en
t, 
th
ro
ug
ho
ut
 th
e 
co
un
tr
y.
Tr
ea
su
ry
 S
in
gl
e 
A
cc
ou
nt
 (T
SA
):
to
 im
pr
ov
e 
ca
sh
 fo
re
ca
st
in
g 
an
d 
ca
sh
 m
an
ag
em
en
t w
ith
 th
e 
ob
je
ct
iv
e 
of
 re
du
ci
ng
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t i
dl
e 
ba
la
nc
es
, s
tr
ea
m
lin
in
g 
fu
nd
s 
re
le
as
e,
  i
nt
eg
ra
tin
g 
ca
sh
 a
nd
 d
eb
t m
an
ag
em
en
t 
an
d 
re
du
ci
ng
 th
e 
ov
er
al
l c
os
t o
f G
ov
er
nm
en
t b
or
ro
w
in
g
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
m
od
ul
es
 fo
r:
bu
dg
et
 m
an
ag
em
en
t; 
co
m
m
itm
en
t m
an
ag
em
en
t;
pa
ym
en
ts
 m
an
ag
em
en
t; 
re
ce
ip
t m
an
ag
em
en
t;
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 a
nd
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g;
ca
sh
 m
an
ag
em
en
t; 
s
ca
l/
na
nc
ia
l r
ep
or
tin
g;
an
d 
fu
nc
tio
na
l a
nd
 a
ut
ho
ris
at
io
ns
;
el
ec
tr
on
ic
 fu
nd
 tr
an
sf
er
. 
A
 s
ta
te
 o
f t
he
 a
rt
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
:
th
e 
O
ra
cl
e 
eB
us
in
es
s 
Su
ite
 s
of
tw
ar
e,
 a
nd
 O
ra
cl
e 
Pa
yr
ol
l/H
RM
IS
A
n 
up
-t
o-
da
te
 IT
 in
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
: 
el
ec
tr
on
ic
 d
at
a 
tr
an
sm
is
si
on
 s
ys
te
m
s 
(w
id
e 
ar
ea
ne
tw
or
k-
W
A
N
/ l
oc
al
 a
re
a 
ne
tw
or
k-
LA
N
) a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ts
 fo
r s
er
ve
rs
 a
nd
de
sk
to
p 
co
m
pu
te
rs
 a
nd
 re
la
te
d 
st
or
ag
e 
an
d 
ba
ck
up
/d
is
as
te
r r
ec
ov
er
y 
sy
st
em
s.
A
ut
om
at
ed
 s
ys
te
m
 g
en
er
at
ed
 c
he
qu
es
 
i n
 th
e 
O
ra
cl
e 
Ac
co
un
ts
 to
 fa
ci
lit
at
e 
re
al
 ti
m
e 
ba
nk
re
co
nc
ili
at
io
n 
fo
r a
ll 
m
in
is
tr
ie
s, 
de
pa
rt
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 a
ge
nc
ie
s.
W
he
n 
th
e 
TS
A
 b
eg
in
s 
to
 in
co
rp
or
at
e 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 b
an
k 
ac
co
un
ts
, 
fu
ll 
sy
st
em
-b
as
ed
 re
co
nc
ili
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
Co
nt
ro
lle
r a
nd
 A
cc
ou
nt
an
t G
en
er
al
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
t a
cc
ou
nt
s 
w
ith
 b
an
k 
ba
la
nc
es
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 in
 p
la
ce
.
In
st
it
ut
io
na
l r
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ti
es
 fo
r b
ud
ge
ti
ng
 a
nd
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g:
D
ire
ct
or
 o
f B
ud
ge
t i
s 
in
 c
ha
rg
e 
of
 p
la
nn
in
g 
an
d 
im
pl
em
en
tin
g 
th
e 
bu
dg
et
 m
an
ag
em
en
t f
un
ct
io
n 
us
in
g 
th
e 
bu
dg
et
 m
od
ul
e 
H
yp
er
io
n;
 
th
e 
Co
nt
ro
lle
r a
nd
 A
cc
ou
nt
an
t-
G
en
er
al
 is
 in
 c
ha
rg
e 
of
 p
la
nn
in
g 
an
d 
im
pl
em
en
tin
g 
th
e
bu
dg
et
 e
xe
cu
tio
n,
 
na
nc
ia
l a
cc
ou
nt
in
g,
 
na
nc
ia
l r
ep
or
tin
g,
 a
nd
 c
as
h 
m
an
ag
em
en
t
fu
nc
tio
ns
 a
nd
 u
se
s 
th
e 
n
an
ci
al
 m
od
ul
es
.  T
he
 C
on
tr
ol
le
r a
nd
 A
cc
ou
nt
an
t-
G
en
er
al
 h
as
 e
nh
an
ce
d 
co
m
m
itm
en
t c
on
tr
ol
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
w
id
es
pr
ea
d 
us
e 
of
 th
e 
Pu
rc
ha
se
O
rd
er
 m
od
ul
e 
at
 a
ll 
le
ve
ls
 o
f G
ov
er
nm
en
t. 
O
nl
y 
th
os
e
pu
rc
ha
se
 o
rd
er
s 
th
at
 a
re
 e
nt
er
ed
, e
di
te
d 
an
d 
ap
pr
ov
ed
 in
 G
IF
M
IS
 a
re
 p
ro
ce
ss
ed
 th
ro
ug
h
to
 p
ay
m
en
t s
ta
tu
s 
fo
r t
he
 C
on
so
lid
at
ed
 F
un
d 
re
la
te
d 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
.
H
yp
er
io
n 
Bu
dg
et
 M
od
ul
e 
fo
r:
on
-s
ite
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 a
ll 
bu
dg
et
 c
on
tr
ol
le
rs
 in
 c
en
tr
al
 m
in
is
tr
ie
s, 
de
pa
rt
m
en
ts
, a
nd
 a
ge
nc
ie
s;
an
d 
an
nu
al
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 a
nd
 s
up
po
rt
 fo
r t
he
 H
yp
er
io
n 
so
ft
w
ar
e,
 im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
se
rv
ic
es
In
te
rf
ac
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
H
RM
IS
 a
nd
 H
yp
er
io
n.
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
pr
ot
oc
ol
s 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
cc
es
s 
to
: 
(i)
 th
e 
Bu
dg
et
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
ts
 a
nd
 V
ot
e 
Co
nt
ro
lle
rs
 in
 th
e 
Li
ne
 M
in
is
tr
ie
s;
 
(ii
) a
ll 
Tr
ea
su
ry
 o

ce
s 
an
d 
se
le
ct
ed
 S
pe
nd
in
g 
un
its
 in
 A
cc
ra
 
w
he
re
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 a
nd
 re
ce
ip
ts
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 a
re
 p
ro
ce
ss
ed
 in
 th
e 
co
un
tr
y;
 
(ii
i) 
re
gi
on
al
 tr
ea
su
rie
s 
w
ho
 a
re
 re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fo
r s
er
vi
ci
ng
 th
e 
re
gi
on
al
 
br
an
ch
es
 o
f t
he
 M
M
D
A
s;
(iv
) m
in
is
tr
ie
s, 
m
un
ic
ip
le
s, 
de
pa
rt
m
en
ts
, a
ge
nc
ie
s 
(M
M
D
A
s)
 a
nd
 
di
st
ric
t t
re
as
ur
ie
s 
w
ho
 a
re
 re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fo
r p
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 g
en
er
at
ed
 
by
 th
e 
di
st
ric
t l
ev
el
 b
ra
nc
he
s 
of
 th
e 
M
M
D
A
s 
. 
Pu
bl
ic
 F
in
an
ci
al
 M
an
ag
em
en
t A
ct
 2
01
6,
 A
ct
 9
21
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
le
ga
l b
ac
ki
ng
 a
nd
 v
al
id
ity
fo
r G
IF
M
IS
 a
nd
 it
s 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
pr
ot
oc
ol
s
So
ur
ce
: B
as
ed
 o
n 
ou
r fi
eld
w
or
k 
da
ta
Behind the World Bank’s 
ringing declarations of 
“social accountability”: 
Ghana’s public financial 
management reform
Alawattage 
and
Azure
2019
Accepted manuscript:
Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting
23
As Figure 1 shows, public-sector accountability reforms through GIFMIS involve 
instigating fiscal discipline by enhancing the normalisation, recordability, traceability, 
visibility and hence controllability (i.e., accountability’s disciplinary dispositifs) of 
public spending by the political state’s various elements. These disciplinary dispositifs 
are enacted and enabled by integrative uses of the following: accounting technologies 
and procedures; information technologies and procedures; and administrative and 
legal systems and procedures (Figure 1 lists constitutive elements of these). GIFMIS 
is in effect a consolidated data processing and analysing platform that, through 
codification and unification, offers possibilities for integration, cross-referencing, 
and normalisation. Consequently, the performance data of MDAs and even details 
of particular transactions and events are readily available in the system (without the 
system, special requests need to be placed for information from the relevant parties, 
who may have to-and hence effectively can – ‘fabricate’ information to meet the 
request). Evidently, GIFMIS has enabled certain disciplinary apparatuses of seeing 
without being seen (Hopper and Macintosh 1993; Rose and Miller 2010). As some 
respondents observe:
We sit here and see what goes on even at the remote parts of the country. It 
is just a matter of logging on to the system. In the past we had accounting 
officers playing ‘tricks’ with contractors. With this system, we see the 
status of a transaction, where it has gotten to, and who is intentionally 
delaying the transaction. (Interviewee 10)
With GIFMIS, we can sit here in Accra and run Regional and District 
reports in a matter of hours. That is why we call it an integrated system. 
… sharing a common platform for all public funds. The system has the 
advantages of speed and accuracy. (Interviewee 12).
In fact, I suspect it is the fear of transparency that is making some 
revenue-generating departments to resist getting hooked onto the 
system in a subtle way. We have been to these departments since 2013 to 
give them some sensitisation. Initially, they asked us to give them time to 
study the system. … we just came from the office of the Vice President. 
He called for the list of those departments resisting getting hooked on 
GIFMIS. (Interviewee 12)
Indeed, the system’s visibility affords everyone access rights to verify and ascertain 
given information, as a local Treasury Officer conveyed: 
You see the man who just left the office? He is from Agric. When he 
came in the morning, I mistakenly told him that the warrant was for 
stationary and item 13. But when he went back to his office, he checked 
from the system and realised that it is for training instead. In the past, 
this officer wouldn’t have found out. … departmental accountants relied 
on the word of mouth of treasury officers who could even lie. This time 
around, you can’t do so because everything is on the system so anyone 
who has access can see. (Interviewee 32)
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The disciplinary gaze so created was both vertical and lateral. It enables people at the 
top of the administrative hierarchy (and Development Partners) and many others 
laterally in the system (subject to certain administrative access restrictions of course) 
to see what is being recorded and processed. However, this enhanced disciplinary 
gaze would not necessarily bring effective control over the misuse of public funds and 
corruption. As many respondents commented, people possibly ignore or are asked 
by the “men [sic] in power” to ignore the abnormalities they notice. After all, “the 
system processes only what it is made to process”. Many believe there are “so many 
things not going through the system or not being processed exactly as they actually 
are”. As other accounting researchers have also demonstrated, neopatrimonialism and 
political patronage often overrun the system (see Hopper 2017; Lassou 2017; Lassou 
and Hopper 2016; Tsamenyi et al. 2009). This was evident in the lead up to the 2016 
general elections when the system was routinely circumvented.  As a result, arrears 
amounting to 2 percent of GDP was only discovered when a new government came 
into office in 2017 (see, World Bank 2018; IMF 2017)
4.3 Short-circuiting democracy: WB’s social accountability 
WB’s discourse on accountability is interestingly paradoxical. As just discussed, WB’s 
approach to accountability comprised three interrelated and interlocking elements: 
legal codification of accountability, technological and administrative enhancement 
of disciplinary gaze, and its emerging agenda of social accountability. Regarding 
social accountability, WB’s rhetoric propagates a very appealing idea: a form of 
citizen engagement it defines as the “extent and capability of citizens (including civil 
society groups) to hold the state accountable and make it responsive to their needs” 
(World Bank 2012a, 30-31), which basically covers “the broad range of actions and 
mechanisms beyond voting that citizens can use to hold the state to account” (Malena 
and McNeil 2010, 1). Friis-Hansen and Ravnkilde (2013), writing in the Danish 
Institute for International Studies’ report - “Social Accountability Mechanisms 
and Access to Public Service Delivery in Rural Africa”, even argue that WB’s notion 
of social accountability reflects a human rights-based approach to development, 
whereby all citizens have the right to obtain justifications and explanations for uses of 
public resources and public officials’ performance. However, when we move beyond 
this rhetoric into what lies behind these ringing declarations through a closer reading 
of WB discourses, together with our fieldwork respondents’ experiences, a rather 
different understanding of WB’s social accountability agenda lurks. 
As conceptualised in the 2004 WDR (World Bank 2004), WB’s conception of social 
accountability is based on a principal-agent model that introduces the idea of “client 
power”. Conceptually, the report emphasises the principal-agent framework as the 
most relevant conceptual tool for understanding the relationship between citizen 
demand and public-sector service delivery. In line with the neoliberal ideology that 
the NPM generally promotes, it also emphasises the importance of market principles 
for reforming public service delivery systems, with citizens being viewed principally 
as “clients” who reward good service with loyalty or who punish poor performance 
by “exiting” and opting for alternatives (see Ackerman 2004; Grandvoinnet et al. 
2015). With the principal-agent approach becoming the taken-for-granted wisdom 
in mainstream development thinking, WB asks us to believe two things: citizens 
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are ultimately the primary principals, regardless of whether or not they actually live 
under electorally competitive regimes; and citizen’s incapacity to make ‘proper’ (i.e. 
economically efficient) political decisions emanates from ‘information asymmetry’ 
between the citizen, the political state and service providers. The agency problem 
arises, for WB, because of the “apathy of the state” and because information asymmetry 
prevents principals (i.e. citizens) from monitoring agents effectively when these two 
actors’ aims differ. WB (World Bank 2004, 56) postulates its version of the agency 
problem:
A common cause of the failure of public service production is the apathy 
of the state. Governments may care about some services for ideological 
reasons. But when voice is weak (or divided or conflicted) and the state 
is freed from the constraint of satisfying its citizens, there are many 
possibilities for failure. The state delivers little or nothing to its poor and 
socially disadvantaged citizens, reserving its few services for the elite, 
including favoured members of the government. In these circumstances 
alternative strategies of public sector management will be powerless to 
create better services. … Nor is much information generated that would 
allow citizens to judge how effectively their government is providing 
services. Since information is power, it is often closely guarded – or 
never created in the first place. Politicians seldom create information 
about outputs and outcomes. Individuals know about the quality of the 
services they confront, but they have a difficult time translating that 
knowledge into public power. Indeed, politicians may use the selective 
provision of services as a clientelistic tool to ‘buy’ political support – or 
worse, to enforce state control of citizens while weakening their voice.
In this postulation, WB effectively transforms a bigger political problem into an 
economic problem of agency that needs mitigating through managerial actions of 
‘disciplining’ at micro-organisational levels rather than macro-political dialogues 
and deliberations to enhance agonistic possibilities. Thus, the “political” is reduced to 
organisational “politics” (Mouffe 2013). Accordingly, and paradoxically, the solution 
is to “short-route” the democracy. 
The discursively influential WDR 2004 built on this principal-agent modelling 
and the idea of “client power” to identify two routes to social accountability: the 
“long-route” and the “short-route” (WB depicts these in Figure 2 below). The “long-
route” has citizens exercise their “principal-ness” by delegating authority to political 
representatives, who then govern bureaucracies by choosing policymakers who in 
turn form “compacts” to manage frontline service providers. The Bank describes this 
as a nested set of principal-agent relationships and hence less effective and efficient. 
In contrast, the “short-route” links citizens directly to service providers through 
“various oversight and voice mechanisms” outside the state’s political apparatuses. 
Strengthening the “short-route”, argues WB, therefore focuses on tools to disseminate 
information and enable citizens to demand their entitlements more forcibly. 
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Figure 2: WB’s conception of social accountability
THE STATE
POLITICIANS POLICYMAKERS
CITIZENS/CLIENTS
NONPOOR POOR
COALITIONS / INCLUSION
PROVIDERS
FRONTLINE ORGANIZATIONS
MANAGEMENT
V
O
IC
E
COM
PACT
   SERVICES  
CLIENT POWER
LO
NG
 ROU
TE OF ACCOUNTABILITY
SHORT ROUTE
Source: World Bank (2004, 49)
As such, social accountability for WB is economic ‘short-circuiting’ the political 
democracy, bypassing the political state formed through the political choices people 
made in democratic politics. Underlying this commitment is WB’s neoliberal 
ideology that the political state is rendering itself necessarily ineffective and inefficient 
through its own apathy (see quote above). WB’s social accountability thus envisages a 
model of governance and accountability without the government, where politics is a 
market-based relationship between the ‘citizen’ (who needs converting into a “client” 
or “customer”) and the so-called “service providers” (entities of private capital to 
whom the service delivery is given via privatisation). Despite WB’s ringing declaration 
that this is ‘social accountability’, it is a pure economic version of accountability that 
heavily relies on a rather questionable notion of “client power”. WB never clarified its 
notion of “client power”6, but it implies that citizens would gain more effective power 
when they become the service providers’ clients rather than remain citizens of the 
state for two reasons: clients operate in a market whereas citizens operate in politics, 
6 At its best, the notion of client power is explained as follows: “Of the provider to 
the citizen-client: client power. Because the policymaker cannot specify all actions 
of providers in the compact, citizens must reveal to providers their demand for ser-
vices and monitor the providers’ provision of services. Clients and organizational 
providers interact through the individuals who provide services – teachers, doc-
tors, engineers, repairmen – frontline professionals and frontline workers” (World 
Bank 2004, 51).
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and for WB the market arena is always better (i.e. economically efficient) than the 
political arena. This is in effect an attempt at transplanting the political sovereignty of 
national governments by market sovereignty of private capital (albeit propagated via 
“client power”, but in a supplier-dominated market scenario of public service delivery) 
- neoliberalism par excellence! 
4.3.1 WB’s global governance apparatuses for social accountability 
Fox (2015) highlights how WB’s “long-route” metaphor omits the potential and crucial 
contributions of other public ‘checks and balances’ institutions such as legislatures, the 
judicial system, audit institutions, ombudsman agencies or public information access 
reforms. The “short-route” approach to addressing frontline service providers is also 
exclusively local, reflecting an assumption that institutional failures are primarily local 
rather than distributed up the governance “supply chain”. However, Devarajan et al.’s 
(2014) recent empirical work concludes that there is actually no “short-route” when 
the problem is “governance failure”. They argue that there is no way around the central 
issue of political accountability and the incentive structures that influence the degree 
to which elected officials are responsive to citizens.
As these critiques show, there is no short-route for political accountability. By 2011, 
WB seemingly realises this. To demonstrate its commitment to social accountability, 
the Bank Board approved the founding of the Global Partnership for Social 
Accountability (GPSA). The Board paper authorising this gives a compelling vision for 
the GPSA as a means of reflecting the voices of beneficiaries, promoting transparency 
and accountability, and achieving stronger development results. The GPSA derived 
from extensive consultations with WB’s shareholders, civil society, and staff during 
2011 and 2012, culminating in its June 2012 launch. At the launch, President Kim 
and senior managers highlighted the potential for creating the “third arm” of the 
World Bank Group to build on previous WB programmes for supporting civil society 
organisations (CSOs). 
At the 2015 GPSA Global Partners Forum, WB Vice President Keith Hansen declared 
with confidence:
The relevant question to ask at this stage is not whether the shift toward 
social accountability is happening or not, but how quickly development 
practitioners and international organisations can embrace this agenda 
and respond. (Global Partnership for Social Accountability and World 
Bank 2015, 7)
The PGSA’s establishment and WB’s attempt to empower it as a global consolidating 
body of accountability basically mean WB is now creating a different “long-route” that 
will replace the national government with WB’s institutional apparatuses, towards 
which the local politicians and administrators are now made accountable. 
4.3.2 Ghanaian experience of WB’s social accountability 
Our discussion so far concentrated on providing a conceptual overview, and a 
theoretical critique of WB’s recent discourses and rhetoric on social accountability. 
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However, as we went on to see how the WB’s social accountability mantra is actually 
implemented in Ghana’s public-sector accountability reforms, we only saw quite 
minimal appearances of empirical instances that we can attribute to any form 
of enhancements in public engagement in policy planning, monitoring of their 
implementation, and evaluation of their efficacy. We queried a lot on this, but our 
queries as to how Ghanaian public, civil society organisations and, let alone, the 
public-sector accountants, administrators, and politicians themselves participated 
in and reshaped the reform discourses resulted in overwhelmingly little empirical 
accounts of such participation. As our despondences revealed, in Ghana’s PFM 
reform, the Bank’s much-vaunted participation, consultation and ownership mantra-
central elements of its social accountability formula-were confined to selected key 
central government agencies such as the Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, and the 
Controller and Accountant-General’s Department (CAGD). An interlocutor captures 
this neatly: 
Yes, there was some form of discussions with the ministry and CAGD. 
Beyond that, no. The World Bank is only to provide the money and make 
sure that the money was used for project implementation. That [ensuring 
consultation and participation] is left to the Government to do, if there is 
even the need for it at all. CAGD had sensitisation workshops for … staff 
and service providers. Not for citizens’ input. (Interviewee 9) 
Another echoed this: 
The World Bank will always promote its own interests. They don’t 
consult on such issues. (Interviewee 14)
Our respondents concur with chapters in Cornwall’s (2011) collection, which provides 
comprehensive analyses of the literature that depicts WB’s rhetoric of participation as 
“tokenism” used to “rubber stamp” and legitimise pre-defined development solutions 
through selectivity of participants and narrow terms of consultation. Similarly, 
other scholars have shown how various participatory initiatives have attempted to 
“empower” people through narrow technical and managerial reforms at the expense 
of addressing deep-seated political and power-based drivers of non-participation and 
marginalisation (Akbulut 2012; O’Meally 2014). Contrastingly, Hickey and Mohan 
(2005, 237) note that participatory approaches are more likely to succeed: (i) where 
they are aimed specifically at securing citizenship rights and marginalised groups’ 
participation; (ii) where they are pursued as part of a wider radical political project; 
and (iii) when they seek to engage with development as an underlying process of 
social change rather than as discrete technocratic intervention.
In Ghana’s PFM reform process, tensions emerged between the desire to ‘democratise’ 
decision-making processes by encouraging wider participation and addressing 
social needs and the administrative moves to make the elements of the political state 
fiscally accountable to WB and the other Development Partners. Confusion and 
confrontation have surfaced regarding what broad policy priorities the reform should 
address: fiscal discipline or the ability and flexibility of local public-servants to handle 
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emerging political and social crises. Currently, it seems to be fiscally responsible, as 
WB demanded, is privileged over social accountability. The business process PFM 
reforms introduced seemingly conflicts with the capacity of local politicians to engage 
in political and social contingencies. Some of our interlocutors expressed this tension. 
For example:
In the case of a cholera outbreak, would you still insist that because 
there’s no budget for drugs or the budget for drugs has not been released 
onto the system that people should die? Is that the democratic will 
and aspiration of the people who elected the government into power? 
(Interviewee 1)
For many respondents, WB’s consultation process was indeed designed to neither 
“listen to the people” nor to “encourage their participation”. For many, it was more 
about consulting than consultation, with “the Bank officers and consultants telling 
us what and how we should do things”. National politicians and reformers privileged 
transnational accountability over their social and political accountability towards the 
local electorates. This was exemplified in the seriousness exhibited towards meeting 
the demands of the WB and Development Partners than listening to the demands of 
the electorate. There was a strong feeling that demands and conditions set by the Bank 
needed to be prioritised. Notions of participation and being democratically responsive 
in a redistributive logic surfaced but were often relegated to the background. What 
was critical for local policymakers and politicians was strict adherence to WB’s project 
conditions. Admittedly, the lead implementing agency in the Financials, CAGD, did 
organise stakeholder sensitisation meetings although these, nevertheless, were limited 
to its own staff and suppliers at the Regional Capitals. As our respondents revealed, the 
incorporation of civil society and the so-called “socially and economically excluded” 
into the reform process was conspicuously absent. Instead, amid all WB’s ringing 
declarations of social accountability, political accountability was subordinated to 
transnational accountability towards WB and Development Partners. One interviewee 
recounts:
When the Bank is in town, everyone is ‘hot’, from the Ministry 
[Finance] to CAGD. Local issues are not accorded the same importance. 
(Interviewee 3) 
Yaw Baah, the Secretary-General of Ghana’s Trade Union Congress, expressed this 
more vividly:
Our leaders and politicians stop listening to you the moment the World 
Bank and IMF come into your country. 
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: THE NEOLIBERAL 
PARADOX OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
This paper primarily contributes to the critical accounting literature by excavating what 
lies behind WB’s ringing declarations of commitments to social accountability. For this, 
it empirically examined the ‘accountability effects’ of WB development discourses in 
Ghana to reveal that WB’s project for enhancing public-sector accountability involves 
three interrelated policy enactments. 
1. First, while acknowledging the “contingency” of the law’s efficacy in enacting 
accountability on its own, WB has invested in enhancing the legal codification 
of public-sector accountability. This legal dimension, as the ‘sovereign core’ of 
biopolitics, is integral to neoliberal governmentality as governmentality has always 
subtly combined the sovereign power of the state and the political power evolving 
outside the state in “pastoral” forms (see Foucault 2000, 2008; Rose and Miller 
2010). In line with the neoliberal doctrines of competition – where everything 
else had to be directed towards constructing fair and efficient markets-the law 
now has given a different purpose: making the policy arena more contestable. 
Referring to so-called “ex-ante” and “ex-post” measures, WB now argues that 
measures such as public hearings, stakeholder consultation, social audits, and 
participatory processes should play a greater role to make the political arena of 
making laws more contestable (World Bank 2017). 
This contestability in the policy arena is an important conceptual move that 
characterises neoliberal global governance and accountability. Implicit in 
establishing “ex-ante procedures” (how the law is made) is constructing a 
‘political space’ where global epistemic institutions such as WB can “effectively 
participate” in the democratic processes of law-making. When coupled with 
different modes of capital and the very “coordinating agency” WB and other 
global epistemic organisations, including global NGOs, hold over the LDCs (see 
Neu et al. 2002), rather than happening through a political dialogue between 
the nation-state and its populace, law-making becomes a technocratic process 
whereby global consultants play a critical role in setting the legal infrastructure 
necessary for privatising and marketizing public service delivery (cf., McKenna 
2006; Saint-Martin 2000; Schmidt-Wellenburgh 2013). While appearing as a 
democratic tool of “stakeholder consultation”, the political space so created is 
rather lopsided and dominated by global epistemic institutions, especially as 
the local populace’s capacity and willingness to participate in such consultation 
is extremely limited and restricted. As our respondents often explained, such 
consultations have become mere sites whereby WB consultants simply “teach the 
locals how things should be done”. Thus, what is contested in effect is the capacity 
of the nation-state and its populace to engage in meaningful political dialogues 
for their own democratic law-making. As such, this neoliberal move highlights a 
marginalised political role for the sovereign nation-state in governance through 
a careful reconstruction of institutional apparatuses that put the state itself into 
the disciplinary gaze by the apparatuses of the global state and the global civil 
society. This is biopolitics- reconstructing political power outside the nation-state 
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(see Foucault 2008; Rose and Miller 2010). 
2. The second is the techno-administrative reforms to public-sector accounting 
systems, which enhanced the ‘disciplinary gaze’. These reforms were techno-
managerial, structural and discursive, aiming to instigate what WB and other 
Development Partners collectively call the “fiscal discipline” – a subjugating 
discourse that renders the state accountability commensurate with its own 
compliance with the measures implemented to reduce its welfare function 
towards its populace and to enhance its capacity to serve the private sector service 
providers, of whom the citizens now should become clients. The measures 
must now ensure that the government promptly pays the businesses that now 
deliver public and welfare services. As such, in terms of techno-managerial 
and accounting protocols, fiscal discipline here implicates on two interrelated 
structural elements of neoliberal governance and accountability. One concerns 
how it shifts the operational elements of delivering public services to the ‘market’ 
institutions’ so that market imperatives of economic efficiency govern the public 
service delivery. It is assumed that such “service providers” delivering under 
market contracts would unquestionably enhance efficiency. This is because the 
other structural element is that it provides a ‘market price’ for public services 
so they can be ‘accounted for’ by purely market criteria rather than the political 
criteria of public welfare. Thus, a new market/economic rationality is instigated 
into the state’s performances of its political functionality of delivering public 
welfare. 
To this end, the transactional interfaces within and between the state and 
other service providers required improvement, and GIFMIS was the techno-
managerial means for this. To enhance the recordability, traceability, visibility 
and hence controllability of public spending by various elements of the 
political state, the accounting package GIFMIS has integrated and consolidated 
three techno-managerial elements: accounting technologies and procedures; 
information technologies and procedures; and administrative and legal systems 
and procedures. Central to this system modernisation were possibilities for 
integration, cross-referencing and normalisation via codification. The disciplinary 
gaze so created was both vertical and lateral. To the extent that administrative 
and legal conditions permits, this system development enabled, with speed and 
accuracy, hierarchical as well as lateral visibility of what is being recorded and 
processed through the system. 
3. The third concerns the “social accountability” theme, which is an explicit attempt 
at “short-routing” what WB calls the inefficient “long-route of accountability”. 
WB promotes a “short-route” through which citizens, being reconceptualised 
as “clients”, should directly encounter “service providers” with a market model of 
contracting. In this “short-routed” model of neoliberal democracy, the citizens’ 
‘political power’, conventionally exercised through voting, needs replacing with 
an economic formulation of what WB calls “client power”. In this postulation, 
WB discourses market-based transactions and informational exchanges as direct 
modes of democracy, which “efficiently” reduce the “political” and “politics” (see 
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footnote 2 and Mouffe 2005, 2013) into “economical” and “market transactions” 
respectively. Constructing this rather economic “client power” desirably happens 
through “various oversight and voice mechanisms”. These involve, according 
to our empirical accounts, mere “consultations” in which “fiscal compliance” 
and “economic efficiency” have always been what is demanded from the local 
recipients of WB’s loans with prescriptions.
Returning to this paper’s original focus regarding what lies behind the ringing 
declarations of social accountability and how WB’s social accountability would 
stand against dialogic and agonistic notions of accountability, WB’s notion of social 
accountability is evidently a disguised form of functional accountability that seeks to 
impose market-based transactional contracts on the political relationships between 
the nation-state and its populace. All three elements discussed above involve a 
neoliberal extension of market rationality to govern the political and social, and the 
social’s terminology is applicable only in that market rationality now supposedly works 
in the social and political. This shows biopolitical global governmentality as ‘anti-
social’ because it accelerates the reproduction of political power outside the realms 
of socio-political but within the realms of market economics. This helps the economy 
dominate society and polity – a condition far removed from the social accountability 
that dialogic and agonistic scholars in critical accounting envisaged. 
As we discussed in the theory section, to be truly social, any form of social accountability 
should construct possibilities of counterhegemonic cultural and political practices 
against the dominating hegemony.  To quote from Mouffe (2003, xii), “a central task of 
democratic politics [and, hence, agonistic accountability] is to provide the institutions 
which will permit conflicts to take an ‘agonistic’ form, where the opponents are not 
enemies but adversaries among whom exists a conflictual consensus”. WB’s rhetorical 
projection of its social accountability notions encompasses a ‘promise’ of such 
counterhegemonic possibilities; hence its appeal in the mainstream policy circles. 
The WB in effect discourses a notion of social accountability that promises voice and 
power for the people and, hence, a form of counter-hegemony.  However, there is a 
couple of political caveats that need to be highlighted here in our conclusions. 
1. First is the discursive reconstruction of the ‘local polity’ (i.e., African or Ghanaian 
State) as a corrupted, undisciplined and economically inefficient hegemonic 
order.  While these characterisations of the local state hold certain validity, more 
important here is not simply the ‘truth claim’ but the way in which this ‘truth 
claim’ is mobilised by the WB to reconstruct the hegemony of the global capital, 
of which the local state is a constitutive element. As such, the WB discourses of 
social accountability creates a new enemy – the corrupted and undisciplined 
local state from which the populace needs to be emancipated. Accordingly, the 
core institution of the democracy, the political state itself becomes the enemy of 
the democracy, mainly due to its inability to perform the WB’s economics.   
2. The solution is to ‘depoliticise’ the state along the lines of neoliberal economic 
doctrines.  Hence the contract that the local polity should have with its citizens 
should be not a political contract pertaining to their democratic rights but an 
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economic contract in which the citizens need to be reconceptualised as ‘clients’ 
and the state needs to reconfigure its presence not as a ‘ruler’ and ‘governor’ but 
as a service provided.  The argument is that democracy is only possible when it 
is exercised in a market. This is the form of counter-hegemony that the WB is 
reconstructing through its social accountability reforms. 
These observations confirm other critical accounting scholars’ findings on the 
ideological and operational constitution of WB in particular and neoliberal 
governmentality’s penetration of the social in general. Neu et al. (2002), for example, 
identified how WB’s lending activities, technical assistance activities and report 
publication activities facilitated the diffusion of “globalisation practices” throughout 
higher education. They explain how WB’s “coordinating agency” -coupled with its 
economic, social and symbolic capital – creates varying degrees of coercive, normative 
and mimetic influence. More importantly, although these authors do not explicitly 
refer to Foucauldian governmentality and biopolitics, their analysis illustrates how 
“globalising practices” create a particular set of financial technologies through which 
biopolitical problems and solutions are envisaged and, thereby, a particular mode 
of governmentality is imposed (in the forms of “habitus” – see Bourdieu 1990). In 
concluding their paper, Neu et al. (2002, 287) made a call: “Although we suspect that 
the activities of WB in areas other than education are likely to be similar, additional 
investigation is needed as to how facilitation works in these other fields … [and] 
whether WB’s imposition of a global orthodoxy in effect amounts to a form of ‘symbolic 
violence’.” Our study here responded to this call and illustrated how WB’s public-sector 
reforms impose a dominating form of particular “social accountability” which, in a 
Bourdesian sense, indeed amounts to “symbolic violence” (Bourdieu 1979). 
The governmentality elements of WB operations were explicit and clearer in Neu et al.’s 
subsequent studies (Neu and Gomez 2006; Neu et al. 2006). These studies collectively 
explicate the ways “informing technologies” bundled into WB’s lending agreement 
and educational programmes make objects of governance knowable in terms of 
accounting and financial expertise and thereby reaffirm the expertise and the Bank’s 
influence. Their analyses illustrate the intersection between government mentalities, 
programmes, and technologies (see also Miller and Rose 1990; Neu and Graham 
2006). Extending these governmentality studies into its neoliberal forms, our study 
provides a nuanced account of how WB’s social accountability crusade reinforces 
these governmentality connections between government mentalities, programs, and 
technologies. 
Our study also extends other critical accounting studies’ contributions to WB 
operations in peripheral nations (e.g., Alawattage and Alsaid 2017; Annisette 2004; 
Uddin and Hopper 2001, 2003). In line with these, it highlights WB’s ideological, 
structural and programmatic inclinations towards systems of accountability and 
accounting that superimpose and privilege a rather narrow economic version of 
development and performance management. 
On the nature of neoliberalism that WB promotes in peripheral nations, our study 
articulates how this organisation facilitates the development of political power outside 
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the political state. This takes place through capitalisation or “economising the social” 
(Miller and Power 2013), meaning the political and social are now rationalised with 
the economic rationalities of market efficiency, capital accumulation, and agency-
contracting of political relationships. WB’s social accountability crusade manifests 
this global neoliberalisation project. This observation then reinforces what other 
critical accounting scholars have postulated regarding neoliberal developments (e.g., 
Andrew and Cahill 2017; Chiapello 2017; Cooper 2015; Miller and Power 2013; 
Wickramasinghe 2015).  Finally, we observed a clear disparity between the WB 
accountability agenda’s ground realities, where a rather functional and colonising 
form of accountability is actually aimed at, and the doctrinal face of neoliberal 
accountability where it is discoursed as a form of accountability that emancipates the 
public.  This is quite akin to what leading critiques of neoliberalism explained: there 
is a gross mismatch between the neoliberalism as a utopian project (i.e., one which is 
discoursed as promoting freedom and democracy) and neoliberalism as a political 
project, which is in effect aiming at developing a “capitalism without gloves” in the 
peripheral nations(see Chomsky, 1999; Harvey 2005).       
Further research:  This paper demonstrated the way in which WB and other 
international funding agencies operate in their attempt to establish doctrines and 
institutional apparatuses of neoliberal governance and management.  Particularly, 
our attention has been on the way in which the public sector accounting reforms they 
lead can be seen as an intensification of the disciplinary and biopolitical apparatuses 
of western capitalist modernity.  However, the resulting system of economic and 
political governance, in reality, is far from the ideal-type expectations of the global 
modernity project because such programmatic objectives and elements become rather 
complicated by their infusions and confusions with the African systems of political and 
economic governance. As a burgeoning stream of accounting research (e.g., Hopper 
2017; Hopper et al. 2017; Lassou 2017; Lassou and Hopper 2016; Lassou et al. 2019; 
Tsamenyi et al. 2009) has now started to document, it seems that this infusion and 
confusion take place in different manners in different localities, creating idiosyncratic 
modes of capitalisms such as neopatrimonial capitalism. For accounting researchers 
dealing with the overarching problem of African accounting and development, it is 
important to locate accounting within the processes through which this infusion and 
confusion take place. That is because the political nature of the capitalism emerging 
in Africa depends on the way in which this infusion and confusion take place. In a 
broader sense, this concern can be spelt out in four interrelated research themes 
towards which future research can be directed:
 զ The cultural and institutional politics (e.g., neopatrimonialism) through 
which this infusion and confusion actually take place in different socio-
political, institutional, discursive, and programmatic contexts (i.e. the 
empirical question).  
 զ The ways in which such empirical observations can be theorised 
simultaneously as a universality of the global neoliberal project and a 
particularity of the locality in which the global discourses are put into action 
(the theoretical question). 
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 զ The specific epistemological principles based upon which such cultural-
political dynamics can be accessed, documented, coded and interpreted 
(the methodological question). 
 զ The ways in which local social actors enact and mobilise their indigeneity in 
conducting and performing as well as in counter-conducting and resisting 
the global discourses (the political question)  
We hope African accounting scholars pay a ‘critical’ attention to these issues with an 
agonistic spirit of emancipation, development, and social accountability. 
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